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i. introduction
Bishop Manuhuia Bennett often asked the question: “What did Mäori call New Zealand before the arrival 
of the Päkehä [Europeans]?” After a deliberate pause, he would then simply utter: “Ours”.1
It is beyond doubt that at a point in the history of Aotearoa New Zealand, everything belonged 
to Mäori where Mäori had property rights over the whole of the resources of this country. It is 
moreover, somewhat ironic that such a historic truism becomes the hardest fact to prove when 
scrutinised by imposed statutory tests and judicial frameworks. Furthermore, such tests appear 
to freeze already severely depleted Treaty and aboriginal title rights within a historic strait-jacket 
thereby prohibiting the contemporary development of these rights.
The historical practices and customary traditions that form the basis for the contemporary 
Treaty and aboriginal rights of Mäori were not and should not be frozen in time. Mäori identities, 
practices and rights, like all cultures, were and are constantly undergoing renegotiation, change 
and development. Nevertheless, the law in New Zealand has frozen Mäori rights to a hunter-
gatherer lifestyle that is inappropriate for contemporary Mäori development.
So what is the appropriate development of Mäori rights in New Zealand today? What does it 
mean to be Mäori, Tainui, Maniapoto, Raukawa, Ngäi Tahu, Kahungunu, or a “traditional” Mäori 
group in contemporary 21st century New Zealand?’ Is it best to accept the omnipotent, omniscient 
and omnipresent assimilation of Mäori into the pervasive global culture and economy or should 
Mäori continue to strenuously resist this type of “development” and to hold on to remnants of a 
bygone culture that struggles to co-exist within this neo-liberal globalised world? The seductive 
lure of corporate wealth and alleged prestige may well be assimilating Mäori communities into 
a neo-liberal and neo-tribal corporate identity but there are others who fight vehemently for the 
survival of Mäori as Mäori but in a contemporary context.
This article will analyse the right of Mäori to develop their Treaty and aboriginal rights and to 
not be frozen in time to a bygone hunter-gather lifestyle which hinders 21st century self-determi-
nation aspirations and realities. It is acknowledged that Mäori Treaty rights, aboriginal rights, and 
customary rights differ in origin, content and enforceability but these distinctions are beyond the 
scope of this article. Although important, the author has grouped these rights together in this arti-
cle in terms of analysing how they have been frozen in time by legislative and judicial tests. The 
following discussion will address a number of challenges surrounding frozen Mäori rights that 
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1 Cited in A Sykes “The Tide is Turning: Foreshore and Seabed Presentation” (Unpublished Paper, 9th Annual Mäori 
Legal Forum, Wellington Townhall, 21 July 2010) at 1.
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ultimately hinder the right of Mäori to develop their self-determination rights commensurate with 
the ever changing world in which we live.
The article first discusses the inherent right of indigenous peoples to diversity and self-deter-
mination that provide scope for updated rights. We then analyse briefly the inevitable adaptation 
and development of culture, then extensively aboriginal rights jurisprudence in New Zealand and 
Canada with reference to key judicial tests that freeze indigenous development. The article then 
critiques the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 (now repealed) and the recent Marine and Coastal 
Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 in New Zealand, which continue to perpetuate these flawed tests. 
Finally, the article explores how the Waitangi Tribunal and international law have considered the 
right of Mäori to develop their aboriginal, Treaty and customary rights in a 21st century context.
ii. right to divErsity and sElf-dEtErMination
From the outset, the author’s opinion is that in a 21st century development context, cultural di-
versity is as valuable as the biological diversity upon which the world depends for its proper 
functioning. Appropriately acknowledging cultural diversity within the nation-state and globally 
is a positive development hence ancient indigenous cultures (and non-indigenous cultures for 
that matter) are worthy of preservation, conservation and development. Rather than transforming 
Mäori cultural heritage into what Benjamin Barber has so aptly called “McWorld”,2 the kind of 
development advocated by the Indian economist Amartya Sen3 should be sought – a development 
that brings with it the freedom to individuals and peoples to develop their capabilities, including, 
most importantly, the capability to be themselves. For Mäori, this type of development is a fun-
damental tenet of the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination in international legal dis-
course which as a minimum is about the advancement and development of Mäori in New Zealand, 
as Mäori according to their worldviews, aspirations and priorities but in a modern 21st century 
context.
However, a contemporary legal and political challenge that continues to hinder this kind of 
development is the fossilisation of indigenous treaty rights and the common law doctrine of abo-
riginal rights. Consequently, contemporary indigenous development is frozen into that of a by-
gone age which does not allow for the development of these rights for contemporary 21st century 
indigenous self-determination.
A. Cultural Development Inevitable
There is no culture in the world that does not adapt and evolve with changing environmental, 
political, social and economic circumstances.4 Indeed Underwood held that cultural identity is not 
a static essence that moves unchanged across time. It is constantly, if subtly and perhaps not al-
together consciously, being constructed and reconstructed in response to changing circumstances 
2 B Barber Jihad v McWorld (Ballantyne Books, New York, 1996).
3 A Sen Development as Freedom (Knopf, New York, 2000).
4 Granted, the Jewish diaspora may be one exception to this rule and it is a remarkable exception but orthodox Jews are 
a very interesting and exceptional group of people in this regard. Still, Jewish culture and identity have shifted and 
changed in some aspects albeit incrementally since the time of Moses.
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and new ideological resources encountered by participation in the wider world.5 It is, to use Jolly’s 
apt phrase, a process of “continual recreation rather than passive perpetuation”.6
Change does not necessarily imply that a culture is dying or is less authentic. It depends, 
among other things, on the degree of change that occurs. For example, the respected anthropolo-
gist Dame Joan Metge discussed the ability of Mäori tikanga7 (Mäori customary laws and institu-
tions), indeed Mäori as a people, to change and adapt when she noted:8
The process of transmission between generations inevitably involves adaptation and change, while tra-
ditions take only a few generations to become established. Mäori beliefs and practices are legitimately 
described as “tuku iho no ngä tüpuna” and “traditional” if they have been handed on from generation to 
generation, whether they were first adopted five hundred, one hundred or fifty years ago.
The author subscribes to the view that so long as the core values of the culture are maintained, but 
outwardly manifested in an updated contemporary context, then the culture still has some life to it 
as Judge Eddie Durie (as he was then) noted:9
The lesson of history appears to be that change can be effected without prejudice to customary law pro-
vided the core values of that law are maintained.
Once those core values are lost, however, then the culture begins to lose its authenticity and, in the 
author’s opinion, legitimacy and perhaps even efficacy.
Despite the major societal transformation Mäori communities in New Zealand have under-
gone, Bennion believes the changes to tikanga Mäori rarely produced changes to the “fundamental 
value system”.10 Traditional tikanga Mäori are still regularly adhered to by many Mäori in their 
most overt form on the various marae (Mäori meeting houses). Mäori communities may apply tra-
ditional Mäori custom, consciously or unconsciously, in the everyday management of community 
and family affairs. Today, they may also apply custom consciously, for example, as a result of 
provisions in the charters of Mäori governance entities that they have established for the adminis-
tration of their tribe’s affairs.11
iii. nEW zEaland – aBoriginal rights JurisPrudEncE
The common law doctrine of aboriginal title is relevant to the thesis that Mäori rights have been 
frozen in time by both judicial and legislative decree. For example, in the 1908 decision of the 
High Court of Public Trustee v Loasby,12 Cooper J instituted a three tier customary law test (based 
on aboriginal rights) when deciding whether to adopt a rule of Mäori customary law. The first tier 
was whether the custom existed as a matter of fact, whether “such custom exists as a general cus-
5 G Underwood “Mormonism, the Mäori and Cultural Authenticity” (2000) 35(2) Journal of Pacific History 133.
6 M Jolly “Specters of Inauthenticity” (1992) 4 Contemporary Pacific 57 at 59.
7 For references, see E Durie “Mäori Custom Law” (Unpublished Paper, Wellington, 1994); and “Te Matapunenga: 
A Compendium of References to the Concepts and Institutions of Mäori Customary Law: Proto-Compendium” (Un-
published, Draft Version, Te Mätähauariki Institute, The University of Waikato, June 2007). The latest version is 
forthcoming in 2012.
8 J Metge “Iwi: Word and Meanings” (Unpublished Paper in author’s possession, 1991) at [8.9].
9 E Durie “Governance” (Conference Presentation, “Strategies for the Next Decade: Sovereignty in Action” School of 
Mäori and Pacific Development International Conference, The University of Waikato, 1997) at 116.
10 T Bennion The Mäori Law Review (March 2001), online at <www.bennion.co.nz/mlr/2001/mar.html.>. 
11 Durie, above n 9, at 7.
12 Public Trustee v Loasby (1908) 27 NZLR 801.
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tom of that particular class of the inhabitants of this Dominion who constitute the Mäori race.”13 
The next tier was whether the custom was contrary to statute. The last tier was whether the custom 
was “reasonable, taking the whole of the circumstances into consideration.”14
Subsequently in Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority15 Chillwell J applied 
the Public Trustee v Loasby16 customary title test to find that “customs and practices which in-
clude spiritual elements are cognisable in a court of law provided they are properly established 
by evidence.” The judiciary appears then to have acknowledged that aboriginal rights may evolve 
and develop in time under this third tier of what is reasonable.
The latest and most authoritative New Zealand decision on aboriginal title is the 2003 Court of 
Appeal decision of Attorney-General v Ngäti Apa17 which affirmed the Mäori Land Court’s juris-
diction to investigate claims of Mäori aboriginal rights in the foreshore and seabed.18 However the 
decision was overturned by the controversial and hastily enacted Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 
which is discussed later in the article.
Still, it is clear that Mäori customary law, via the doctrine of aboriginal rights, is cognisable 
and enforceable in the New Zealand courts with some hints of a right to evolve these rights but 
the recognition and inclusion of Mäori custom appears to have been redefined and fossilised by 
Parliament and the judiciary.
We will now discuss briefly the leading Canadian decision that contributes to freezing Mäori 
aboriginal rights in New Zealand.
iv. 1996 van dEr PEEt dEcision frEEzEs aBoriginal rights
The 1996 Supreme Court of Canada decision of R v Van der Peet19 outlines the most exhaus-
tive analysis by Commonwealth courts of the notion of “aboriginality” and what makes a right 
“aboriginal” in character. In other words, the case law prescribes or defines customary indigenous 
identity and rights that accrue to that identity. Van der Peet, moreover, refined the test for recog-
nising indigenous rights by defining the rights identified by s 35 of the Constitution Act 1982 to 
include both aboriginal and treaty rights.20
The Stó:lö appellant sold ten salmon contrary to s 27(5) of the British Columbia Fishery Regu-
lations. She challenged her conviction arguing that the provincial law violated the constitutional 
protection of aboriginal rights in s 35(1) of the Constitution Act 1982. At issue was whether the 
13 Ibid, at 806.
14 Ibid.
15 Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority (1987) 2 NZLR 188 at 215.
16 Public Trustee v Loasby (1908) 27 NZLR 801.
17 Attorney-General v Ngäti Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 643 (CA).
18 Ibid.
19 R v Van der Peet (1996) 2 SCR 507. For a good discussion, among many, on the Van der Peet decision, see RL Barsh 
and JY Henderson “The Supreme Court’s Van der Peet Trilogy: Native Imperialism and Ropes” (1997) 42 McGill LJ 
994.
20 R v Van der Peet [1990] 1 SCR 1075 at [31] and [40]. See also R v Cötë [1996] 3 SCR 139; Kruger v The Queen 
[1978] 1 SCR 104; R v NTC Smokehouse Ltd [1996] 2 SCR 672; R v Nikal [1996] 1 SCR 1013; R v Gladstone [1996] 
2 SCR 723; R v Pamajewon [1996] 2 SCR 821; and Mitchell v MNR [2001] 1 SCR 911.
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aboriginal right of fishery included a right to sell for commercial purposes. The Court agreed that 
the doctrine of aboriginal rights arose through Canadian law as Lamer CJ expounded:21
In my view the doctrine of aboriginal rights exists, and is recognised and affirmed by s. 35(1), because of 
one simple fact: when Europeans arrived in North America, aboriginal peoples were already here, living 
in communities on the land, and participating in distinctive cultures, as they had done for centuries. It is 
this fact, and this fact above all others, which separates aboriginal peoples from all other minority groups 
in Canadian society and which mandates their special legal, and now constitutional, status.
The majority held that the commercial selling of salmon however, was not an “aboriginal” aspect 
of the fishing right.
The majority took an “integral-incidental” test. Lamer CJ found that in order to be an aborigi-
nal right, an activity must be an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to the distinc-
tive culture of the aboriginal group at the time of contact with Europeans.22 In identifying prac-
tices, traditions and customs integral to the distinctive cultures of aboriginal peoples, there are a 
number of factors a court must take into account.
•	 First, they must consider the perspective of aboriginal peoples themselves.
•	 Secondly, they must identify precisely the nature of the claim being made, notably the pos-
sibility that the activities may be the exercise in modern form of practice, tradition or custom 
that existed prior to contact.
•	 Thirdly, in order to be “integral,” a practice, tradition or custom must be of central signifi-
cance to the aboriginal society in question.
Lamer CJ stated that “a practical way of thinking about this problem is to ask whether, without 
this practice, tradition, or custom, the culture in question would be fundamentally altered to other 
than what it is”.23 The practices, traditions and customs that constitute aboriginal rights are those 
which have continuity with the traditions, customs and practices that existed prior to contact. 
McLachlin J held that barring extinguishment or treaty, an Aboriginal right will be established 
once “continuity” can be shown between a modern practice and the Native laws that “held sway 
before superimposition of European laws and customs”.24 Lamer CJ explained the emphasis upon 
pre-contact rather than pre-sovereignty aboriginal society:25
Although it is the sovereignty of the Crown that the pre-existing aboriginal societies are being reconciled 
with, it is to those pre-existing societies that the court must look in defining aboriginal rights. It is not 
the fact that aboriginal societies existed prior to Crown sovereignty that is relevant; it is the fact that they 
existed prior to the arrival of Europeans in North America. As such, the relevant time period is that period 
prior to the arrival of the Europeans, not the period prior to the assertion of sovereignty by the Crown.
Lamer CJ noted that the practice must be of “independent” significance to the aboriginal culture, 
“distinctive” and not merely “distinct”.
Lamer CJ noted further that while the evidence clearly demonstrated that fishing for food and 
ceremonial purposes was a significant and defining feature of the Stó:lö culture, this was not suf-
ficient without a demonstration that it was the exchange of salmon which was a significant and de-
21 R v Van der Peet (1996) 2 SCR 507 at 538, 137 DLR (4th) 289. See also R v Sappier; R v Gray [2006] 2 SCR and R 
v Sundown [1999] 1 SCR 393.
22 Ibid, at 310–315. See also Campbell v British Columbia [2000] BCJ. No. 1524 (BCSC) 139 at [79], [52].
23 R v Van der Peet (Unreported Judgment, 22 August 1996) at 24 per Lamer CJ.
24 R v Van der Peet (1996), above n 21; 137 DLR (4th), above n 21 at 634–635.
25 R v Van der Peet (Unreported Judgment, 22 August 1996) at 34.
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fining feature of Stó:lö culture.26 Given that salmon exchange, although part of the interaction of 
kin and family exchange, was not an integral part of pre-contact Stó:lö society, the pre-sovereign-
ty trade which the band established with the Hudson’s Bay Company did not have the necessary 
continuity to support an aboriginal right. Moreover, the Stó:lö were at a band rather than a tribal 
level of social organisation and the specialisation of labour characteristic of the tribe was absent 
and, therefore, the absence of regularised trade or a market is suggestive that the exchange of fish 
was not a central part of Stó:lö culture.27
The case therefore, concluded that those self-defining practices, customs and traditions that 
qualify as “aboriginal” must be part of a central aspect of pre-contact society which has continued 
to the present. In British Columbia, the magic date for aboriginal rights seems to be 1846.28 In 
New Zealand, the 1840 rule of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi is the magic date for the af-
firmation of aboriginal rights.
A. Frozen Aboriginal Rights
The Stó:lö First Nation asserted that the traditional process used to determine the content of an 
aboriginal right (in this case to fish commercially) created a traditional practice and the doctrine 
of aboriginal rights should transform that practice into an aboriginal right. The Supreme Court did 
not address this aspect of the appellant’s argument but it constructed a standard test to determine 
the content of an aboriginal right by a process that emphasised the need to look at the actuality of 
indigenous practices that created a right to a custom exercised traditionally. The dissenting judg-
ment of L’Heureux-Dube J highlighted the fossilisation of Indigenous traditional rights through 
this process:29
The approach based on aboriginal practices, traditions and customs considers only discrete parts of abo-
riginal culture, separating them from the general culture to which they are rooted. The analysis turns on 
the manifestations of the “integral” part of [the aboriginal’s] distinctive culture.
R v Pamajewon and Jones30 confirmed that the exact nature of the activity claimed to be a right 
must be a defining feature of the culture in question prior to contact with Europeans.31
The majority’s decision in Van der Peet has been heavily criticised for freezing aboriginal 
rights to only those practices that existed prior to colonisation. Indeed, John Borrows opined: 
“Aboriginal rights should exist to ensure Indigenous Peoples’ physical and cultural survival, not 
necessarily to preserve distinctive elements of pre-contact culture.”32
Moreover, making aboriginal rights dependant on the factual continuation of a practice for 170 
or so years is also unreasonable given the fact that pndigenous peoples have been dispossessed, 
disempowered and forcibly assimilated into mainstream during this time. The law is allowing 
colonial history to dictate what is and what is not able to be recognised as a right of indigenous 
26 Ibid, at 41–42.
27 Ibid, at 42–43.
28 As per Delgamuukw v British Columbia [1998] 1 CNLR 14, (Supreme Court of Canada) cited in British Columbia, 
Provincial Policy for Consultation with First Nations (BC Consultation Policy, Victoria, BC, October 2002) at 10.
29 R v Van der Peet (Unreported Judgment, 22 August 1996) at 345–349.
30 R v Pamajewon and Jones (1996) 2 SCR 821.
31 Ibid, at 833.
32 J Borrows “Frozen Rights in Canada: Constitutional Interpretation and the Trickster”(1998) 22(1) Am Indian LR 37 
at 49.
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peoples.33 In other words, only those practices that were able to survive colonisation, as opposed 
to those practices which were created in response to it, are deemed sufficiently “indigenous” or 
“aboriginal” by the courts.34
Still, L’Heureux-Dube J noted that all practices, customs and traditions sufficiently connected 
to the self-identity and self-preservation of organised aboriginal societies should be held to deserve 
the constitutional protection of s 35(1) Constitution Act 1982. What constituted a practice, cus-
tom or tradition distinctive to native culture and society should be examined through the eyes of 
aboriginal people themselves through a dynamic, as opposed to a frozen, approach. The activities 
which comprise the alleged right need not have existed in pre-contact society because that would 
limit any subsequent self-defining capacity only to those pre-contact activities.35 L’Heureux-Dube 
J insisted that the contemporary relevance of aboriginal rights must be considered in relation to 
the needs of the natives as their practices, customs and traditions evolve with the overall society 
within which they live. The activity upon which the right is founded must have formed an inte-
gral part of a distinctive aboriginal culture “for a substantial period of time, a period of 20 to 50 
years.”36 Morse added that the Canadian Van der Peet approach tells aboriginal people that “what 
is relevant about them is their past – not their present or their future”.37
What is determined through this fossilising test is not what indigenous peoples had a right 
to do but what they actually did. If there is no clear evidence of a traditional practice, then that 
will be detrimental to determining a customary right, although the maxim applies that absence of 
evidence is not necessarily evidence of absence. Thus, the Van der Peet aboriginal rights-defining 
process conflicts with the inherent rights of indigenous peoples to self-determination including the 
preservation and development of indigenous peoples’ laws and institutions and the process elicit-
ing the content and scope of those traditional laws and institutions.38
In summary, the Van der Peet principles affirm the notion of “aboriginality” for establishing 
aboriginal rights but they stress the historic origin and continuity of the indigenous practices that 
constitute the group and comprise a particular aboriginal right. In effect, the Van der Peet test for 
aboriginal rights fossilises indigenous customs, practices and traditions in time, thereby limiting 
indigenous self-determination and development rights as Professor Slattery noted, “aboriginal title 
is like an historical diorama in a museum”.39
33 L Godden “Grounding Law as Cultural Memory: A ‘Proper’ Account of Property and Native Title in Australian Law 
and Land” (2003) 19 AFLJ 61 at 72.
34 MT Kennedy “The Tide of History: Canadian Waves Washing Away Mäori Rights in the New Zealand Foreshore 
and Seabed Act” (Unpublished Student Essay, School of Law, University of Victoria, Wellington, New Zealand, 
2010) at 3.
35 R v Van der Peet (Unreported Judgment, 22 August 1996) at 60–61.
36 Ibid.
37 BW Morse “Permafrost Rights: Aboriginal Self-Government and The Supreme Court in R v Pamajewon” (1997) 42 
McGill LJ 1011 at 1031. 
38 For a good analysis of Van der Peet and its implications for Mäori customary laws in New Zealand, see J Kilgour 
“The Te Ika Whenua Decision as an Obstacle to the Right to Development: A Discussion of the Fossilisation of 
Mäori Rights in New Zealand Law”(2001) 1; Te Taarere aa Tawhaki (Journal of the Waikato University College) 
at 192–210; and J Kilgour “Rights Reductionism, Mäori Rights and the New Zealand Common Law: An Essay on 
Cultural Oppression” (Thesis (LLM), School of Law, The University of Waikato, 2000).
39 B Slattery “Understanding Aboriginal Rights” in T Isaac (ed) Readings in Aboriginal Studies (Vol 5 Aboriginal Peo-
ple and Canadian Law, Bearpaw Publishing, Manitoba, 1996) at 24–25.
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v. nEW zEaland – constitutional viEW of thE trEaty and 
aBoriginal rights
The Canadian approach to the fossilisation of aboriginal rights in Van der Peet is germane to 
Mäori in New Zealand. Although aboriginal rights have not received formal constitutional protec-
tion via an entrenched constitutional statute similar to s 35 of the Canadian Constitution Act 1982, 
relevant comparisons can still be made with the Canadian approach given that the Treaty of Wait-
angi has received some constitutional recognition, albeit limited. For example, in the New Zea-
land Court of Appeal, Cooke P implicated the constitution-like status of the Treaty of Waitangi in 
New Zealand Mäori Council v Attorney-General40 when he opined:41
The Treaty is a document relating to fundamental rights; that it should be interpreted widely and effec-
tively and as a living instrument taking account of the subsequent developments of international human 
rights norms ... I accept that this is the correct approach when interpreting ambiguous legislation or work-
ing out the import of an express reference to the principles of the Treaty.
Furthermore, Lord Wolf, in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council noted that the Treaty of 
Waitangi “is of greatest constitutional importance to New Zealand”42 and the Waitangi Tribunal 
asserted that the Treaty must be seen as a “basic constitutional document”.43 Chilwell J recorded 
in a key 1987 High Court decision that the Treaty of Waitangi is “part of the fabric of New Zea-
land society”.44 Sir Robin Cooke speaking extra-judicially added that the Treaty of Waitangi is 
“simply the most important document in New Zealand’s history”.45 Moreover, Cooke P expressly 
left open the question of the Treaty’s precise constitutional status when he wrote that “a nation 
cannot cast adrift from its own foundations. The Treaty stands”.46
In terms of aboriginal rights in New Zealand, the common law has evolved in a manner that 
directly recognises aboriginal rights. In Te Weehi v Regional Officer47 the judiciary consented to 
recognise the mana (authority)48 of local tribes over sea fisheries according to their customary law. 
The guarantees of the Treaty of Waitangi were also indirectly recognised in Te Rünanga o Te Ika 
Whenua Inc Society v Attorney General.49 In this decision, Cooke P stated that unless special cir-
cumstances existed, aboriginal title should not be extinguished without Mäori consent.50 It stands 
to reason that this standard should apply to all aboriginal rights. In the 1997 High Court decision 
of The Taranaki Fish and Game Council v McRitchie,51 Becroft J permitted the defendant’s fish-
ing methods to be employed and extended this aboriginal right to include fish species introduced 
after the Treaty of Waitangi.
40 New Zealand Mäori Council v Attorney General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 (SOE Case).
41 Ibid, at 655–656 per Cooke P.
42 New Zealand Mäori Council v Attorney-General [1994] 1 NZLR 513 at 516 (Broadcasting Assets Case).
43 Waitangi Tribunal The Ngäi Tahu Report (GP Publications, Wellington, 1991) at 224.
44 Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority [1987] 2 NZLR 188 at 210. 
45 R Cooke “Introduction” (1990) NZULR at 1.
46 Te Rünanga o Wharekauri Rekohu v Attorney-General [1993] 2NZLR 301 at 308–309 (CA).
47 Te Weehi v Regional Officer (1986) 6 NZAR 114 (HC).
48 “Mana” is loosely translated as prestige, respect, honour or intrinsic authority that is spiritually endowed and main-
tained. See Mead, HM Tikanga Mäori: Living by Mäori Values (Huia, Wellington, 2003) at 25–35.
49 Te Rünanga o Te Ika Whenua Inc. Society v Attorney General [1994] 2 NZLR 20 [Hereinafter Te Ika Whenua].
50 Ibid, at 24.
51 The Taranaki Fish and Game Council v McRitchie (Unreported, 27 February 1997, Wanganui District Court, ORN 
5083006813-14 per Becroft J) (Overturned by the High Court, 1998).
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However, in New Zealand jurisprudence there is no absolute standard test to determine the 
content of a traditional aboriginal right, but there are some requirements that must be fulfilled. 
There must be detailed and convincing evidence that a traditional practice existed.52 There seem 
to be restrictions as deemed in traditional Mäori society such as tribal jurisdiction over territory 
(mana whenua) and membership of a tribe or who might gain authorisation from a relevant tribal 
authority.53 A stricter test was applied by Hammond J, requiring that the custom must prove to 
have existed since time immemorial (assuming 1840 is “time immemorial”), it must be reason-
able, certain (in nature, locality and who it affects) and must have continued without interruption 
since its origin.54 This test has not been affirmed elsewhere until recently in the Foreshore and 
Seabed Act 2004 (now repealed) and the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 
which may reflect the ad hoc nature of aboriginal rights determination, which requires an empiri-
cal determination of a custom as evidence of a proprietary or usufructuary right. Moreover, in de-
termining whether an action translates into a customary right, the courts will examine whether that 
act featured in traditional Mäori society,55 hence what is determined through these flawed tests is 
what Mäori did, not what they had a right to do.
vi. nEW zEaland – frozEn rights – tE ika WhEnua
In the 1994 Te Rünanganui o Te Ika Whenua Inc Society v Attorney-General56 decision (Te Ika 
Whenua), the full bench of the New Zealand Court of Appeal was confronted by an application 
from Te Rünanganui o Te Ika Whenua Inc Society for an interim declaration by way of judicial 
review. Te Ika Whenua was seeking to stay the privatisation of two Bay of Plenty dams on the 
Rangitaiki and Wheao Rivers until the Waitangi Tribunal could make a recommendation on their 
claims.
The Te Ika Whenua decision represents the view that Mäori culture and any rights that derive 
from it cannot develop beyond colonisation and are, thus, fossilised as Cooke P held:57
… [neither] under the common law doctrine of aboriginal title, nor under the Treaty of Waitangi, nor 
under any New Zealand statute have Mäori, as distinct from other members of the general New Zealand 
community, had preserved or assured to them any right to generate electricity by the use of water power.
The Court of Appeal also held:58
However liberally Mäori customary title and Treaty rights may be construed, one cannot think that they 
were ever conceived as including the right to generate electricity by harnessing water power. Such a sug-
gestion would have been far outside contemplation of the Mäori chiefs and Governor Hobson in 1840.
This Te Ika Whenua test to determine whether a particular object was within the reasonable con-
templation of Mäori chiefs at the time of the signing of the Treaty was applied in Ngäi Tahu Trust 
52 Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer [1986] 1 NZLR 680 (HC) at 690, 691 per Williamson J; Taranaki Fish and 
Game Council v McRitchie [1991] 2 NZLR 139 (CA) at 147. 
53 Ibid.
54 Knowles v Police (1998) 15 CRNZ 423 at 426.
55 However, in MAF v Love [1998] DCR 370 (DC), it was held that Mäori had no commercial fishing right regardless of 
evidence of bartering.
56 Te Ika Whenua, above n 49,
57 Ibid, at 25.
58 Ibid, at 24.
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Board v Director General of Conservation59 with respect to tourism and whale watching. This test 
allows the Courts to restrict the interpretation of Mäori Treaty and aboriginal rights through their 
limited perception of Mäori intention.
Dr Alex Frame commented on the Te Ika Whenua decision that:60
“it will not comfort those who seek certainty in law to learn that Mäori customary rights are of an indeter-
minate nature and of an extent dependent on the Court of Appeal’s view of what was in the mind of the 
Mäori chiefs and Governor Hobson at Waitangi in 1840”.
It is also interesting to note that neither Treaty of Waitangi party (Mäori nor British) contemplated 
hydroelectric development in 1840 but the latter party has a contemporary right to the develop-
ment of hydroelectricity while the former seems to be locked into “an historical diorama in a 
museum.”
In a manner similar to the Van der Peet test in Canada, the Court of Appeal in Te Ika Whenua 
fossilised Mäori Treaty and aboriginal rights to that which was contemplated by Mäori in 1840. 
Accordingly, some people object to Mäori seeking updated and modern Treaty and aboriginal 
rights, such as Don Brash who opined “some people are trying to wrench the Treaty out of its 
1840 context”.61 Such a narrow view prohibits the inevitable evolution and development of culture 
and aboriginal rights.
One is inclined to ask why is it that of the parties to the Treaty of Waitangi, Mäori are not al-
lowed to develop their rights while the other party can. It appears that one possible answer could 
be based on a theory of the “purity of development”. There is an ability for indigenous peoples to 
develop but if any development integrates with the knowledge, technology or processes of another 
culture or nation, then it is irreparably removed from indigenous development.62 Such an approach 
is duplicitous at best given that western society is permitted the amalgamation and even exploi-
tation of other (including indigenous) knowledge and technologies without similar detriment to 
their own rights.63
vii. nEW zEaland uPdatE
A. Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004
A relatively recent example of the freezing of Mäori aboriginal and Treaty rights to 1840, under-
mining the right of Mäori “aboriginality” to develop, is the vexed and politically charged area of 
the foreshore and seabed. The Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 extinguished Mäori tikanga and 
common law aboriginal rights in the foreshore and seabed and replaced them with full Crown 
59 Ngäi Tahu Trust Board v Director General of Conservation [1995] 3 NZLR 533 at 561. See also Waitangi Tribunal 
Report, The Radio Spectrum Management and Development Final Report (Wai 776, GP Publications, Wellington, 
1999) at 59.
60 A Frame Property and the Treaty of Waitangi: A Tragedy of the Commodities? (Te Mätähauariki Institute, The Uni-
versity of Waikato Press, Hamilton, 2001) at 7.
61 D Brash “Nationhood” (Unpublished National Party Address, Orewa Rotary Club, Auckland, 27 January 2004) at 2.
62 See R Boast Rangahaua Whanui National Theme Report (Waitangi Tribunal Reports, GP Publications, Wellington, 
1996). 
63 Waitangi Tribunal Ko Aotearoa Tenei: A Report into Claims Concerning New Zealand Law and Policy Affecting 
Mäori Culture and Identity (Wai 262, Wellington, 2011).
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title, which Moana Jackson declared was in effect a modern day raupatu (confiscation) that clearly 
breached Articles II and III of the Treaty of Waitangi and standard common law rules.64
It came as no surprise that to establish customary aboriginal rights, Mäori claimant groups had 
to establish that their rights and title in the foreshore and seabed existed prior to 1840 and continue 
uninterrupted up to the present day, particularly in s 39 of the Act. A customary rights order was 
defined in the s 5 interpretation section of the Act as a public foreshore and seabed customary 
rights order made by either the Mäori Land Court under s 50; or the High Court under s 74.
Under ss 50 and 51, Mäori groups could apply to the Mäori Land Court, and any other group 
of New Zealanders could apply to the High Court, for a customary rights order to recognise a 
particular activity, use or practice carried out in an area of the coastal marine area. These were 
non-territorial customary rights that related to an activity and not ownership.
Section 49 of the Act required the use, activity or practice being claimed as a right to be “in-
tegral” to tikanga Mäori and to have existed continually since 1840. This integral and continuing 
test appeared to be the test set out by Lamer CJ in Van der Peet.65 Kent McNeil analysed the 
Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 with Canadian jurisprudence and criticised it on the basis that the 
Foreshore and Seabed Act adopted:66
...two of the most doctrinally flawed and heavily criticised aspects of the law on indigenous land rights 
in Canada. Namely, the integral to the distinctive culture test and the requirement of substantial mainte-
nance and the continuation with the land in accordance with traditional laws and customs.
The Ministerial Review of the Foreshore and Seabed Act noted that this “integral” requirement 
most likely derived from the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Van der Peet.67 The review 
panel questioned how high should the traditional activity threshold be for this “integral test” and 
then cited Lamer CJ referring to high levels of centrality, significance and distinctiveness:68
To satisfy the integral to a distinctive culture test the aboriginal claimant group must do more than dem-
onstrate that a practice, custom or tradition was an aspect of, or took place in, the aboriginal society of 
which he or she is a part. The claimant must demonstrate that the practice, custom or tradition was a 
central or significant part of the society’s distinctive culture. He or she must demonstrate, in other words, 
that the practice, custom or tradition was one of the things which made the culture of the society distinc-
tive – that it was one of the things that truly made the society what it was.
Commentators have argued that Chief Justice Lamer’s threshold test is too high.69 For example, 
is taking whitebait something that made Mäori society what is was? It depends on what the tradi-
tional “activity” was. Maybe whitebaiting did not make Mäori society what it was per se but the 
general “activity” of fishing certainly did. Still, given that neither customary rights orders were 
issued, nor was there any body of precedent on the interpretation of this aspect of the Act, and the 
64 M Jackson “An Analysis of the Foreshore and Seabed Bill” (Mäori Law Commission, Wellington, May 2004) at 1.
65 R v Van der Peet, above n 21.
66 K McNeil “Legal Rights and Legislative Wrongs: Mäori Claims to the Foreshore and Seabed” in C Charters and A 
Erueti, (eds) Mäori Property Rights and the Foreshore and Seabed: The Last Frontier (Victoria University Press, 
Wellington, 2007) at 97. See also G Christie “Aboriginal Rights, Aboriginal Culture, Aboriginal Protection” (1998) 
36 Osgoode Hall LJ 447; and G Christie “Development Case Law: The Future of Consultation and Accommodation” 
(2006) 39 UBC Law Rev 139.
67 E Durie, R Boast and H O’Regan Pakia ki Uta, Pakia ki Tai: Report of the Ministerial Review Panel of the Foreshore 
and Seabed Act 2004 (New Zealand Government, Wellington, Vol 1, 2010) at 129. 
68 R v Van der Peet, above n 21, at [55].
69 R Boast Foreshore and Seabed (Lexis-Nexis, Wellington, 2005) at 175.
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recent repeal of Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, made the challenges around the integral activity 
threshold in New Zealand difficult to ascertain.
In its recent review of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, however, the current New Zealand 
Government noted that it “believed it inappropriate to use a test based entirely on another coun-
try’s legal experience”.70 Although it is well accepted and prudent to address the development of 
legal principles and precedents in other countries when developing domestic law, it was inappro-
priate with the enactment of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004. Given that the frozen aboriginal 
rights Van der Peet test is flawed in Canada, what makes it any better in New Zealand?
Furthermore,  Chief Justice Elias affirmed in Attorney-General v Ngäti Apa71 that the common 
law in New Zealand is different to other common law countries:72
But from the beginning of the common law of New Zealand as applied in the Courts, it differed from the 
common law of England because it reflected local circumstances.
Chief Justice Elias continued:73
Any prerogative of the Crown as to property in the foreshore or seabed as a matter of English common 
law in 1840 cannot apply in New Zealand if displaced by local circumstances. Mäori custom and usage 
recognising property in the foreshore and seabed lands displaces any English Crown Prerogative and is 
effective as a matter of New Zealand law unless such property interests have been lawfully extinguished. 
The existence and extent of any such property interest is determined by application of tikanga.
The common law of New Zealand is not the same as the common law of England or Canada be-
cause it reflects local circumstances. One such local circumstance that makes the New Zealand 
legal system distinct is the acknowledgement of its first law, tikanga Mäori customary laws.
With respect, the legislature should have refrained from defining Mäori Treaty and aboriginal 
“rights” according to what Canadian judges believe aboriginal peoples’ “rights” to be in Canada. 
The legislature adopted the flawed Canadian common law “integral and continuing test” from 
Van der Peet and codified it. In doing so, while this test is open for subsequent Canadian courts 
to adjust, the judiciary in New Zealand is robbed somewhat of this potential flexibility. In addi-
tion, the “integral and continuing test” is flawed given that it freezes indigenous peoples’ rights in 
a “historic diorama in a museum” thus inhibiting its scope for adaptation and development in the 
21st century.
B. Marine and Coastal (Takutai Moana) Act 2011
The Marine and Coastal (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 (the Act) repeals the Foreshore and Seabed 
Act 2004 and introduces a new framework for recognising and protecting customary rights in 
the marine and coastal area. This recognition will include the right to go to the High Court (or to 
negotiate an out-of-court settlement with the Crown) to seek customary marine title for areas with 
which groups such as iwi (tribes) and hapü (sub-tribes) have a longstanding and exclusive history 
of use and occupation.
A glimmer of hope emerged in the Act where it acknowledges in s. 51 that customary rights 
develop and evolve over time which is a significant concession. Sections 51 states:
70 New Zealand Government Reviewing the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004: Consultation Document (New Zealand 
Government, Wellington, March 2010) at 33.
71 Attorney-General v Ngäti Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 577.
72 Ibid, at 652, [17].
73 Ibid, at 660, [49].
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51 Meaning of protected customary rights
(1) A protected customary right is a right that—
(a) has been exercised since 1840; and
(b) continues to be exercised in a particular part of the common marine and coastal area in accordance 
with tikanga by the applicant group, whether it continues to be exercised in exactly the same or a similar 
way, or evolves over time; and
(c) is not extinguished as a matter of law [emphasis added].
Section 51 appears to remove the former Van der Peet integral component test which is a positive 
development in the author’s view. However, optimism needs to be balanced with caution.
Retaining the requirement, in s 58 of the Act, for the custom to have been continually prac-
tised in a substantially uninterrupted manner since 1840, severely restricts and continues to freeze 
Mäori customary rights, notwithstanding s 51 acknowledging that aboriginal rights evolve. The 
activity must be carried on in the marine and coastal area; it must have been continually exercised 
since 1840; it cannot be prohibited by any enactment or rule of law; and has to be unextinguished, 
which is a high threshold. Commenting on these provisions in the Hansard debates, Catherine 
Delahuntly cautioned:74
In my limited experience, a limited list of hapü—perhaps Te Tairäwhiti—may be able to pass this test, 
but I ask who else and where? And even within that rohe … I can think of numerous examples where 
mana whenua hapü simply could not pass that test, as a result of colonisation.
Hone Harawira added:75
This Bill should be called the Foreshore and Seabed Act Revisited; because Minister Finlayson’s com-
ment that “Mäori will have to show that they held exclusive use and occupation of the area since 1840, 
without substantial interruption, and that the area in question was held in accordance with tikanga” is 
exactly the same as in 2004. … the research [shows] that 98% of Mäori will NOT be able to prove un-
broken tenure, [which] confirms the Prime Minister’s view that Mäori don’t stand a Mäori’s chance in 
parliament of getting their land back.
Similarly, Annette Sykes concluded:76
When the Prime Minister announced this proposal ... he confirmed his view that very few Iwi [tribes] 
would be able to meet the criteria for seeking customary title77... they will let us on the playing field, but 
set the goal so high that effectively it remains unachievable, and if required, change the goal posts to en-
sure the protection of majoritarian principles that will ensure their right to govern.
Customary rights should not require lengthy litigation due to difficult evidentiary requirements to 
prove such a “continuous practice since 1840” because the imposition is not likely to come into 
conflict with others’ rights. The authors of the Ministerial Review of the Foreshore and Seabed 
Act 2004 even noted that politicians give “collecting hangi stones from the beach” as an example 
of a potential content of a customary right78 which appears to freeze Mäori Treaty and aboriginal 
74 “Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Bill” (15 March 2011) 670 NZPD 17280.
75 Hone Harawira, “Verbal Submission on the Marine and Coastal Areas (Takutai Moana) Bill, 14 December 2010”. 
Online on the Hone Harawira website: <hone.co.nz/2010/12/14/verbal-submission-to-the-Mäori-affairs-select- 
committee-on-the-marine-and-coastal-areas-bill/>.
76 A Sykes “The Tide is Turning: Foreshore and Seabed Presentation” (Unpublished, 9th Annual Mäori Legal Forum, 
Wellington Town Hall, 21 July 2010) at 7.
77 See “Foreshore and seabed legislation to be repealed” at <www.stuff.co.nz> November 2010.
78 Ministerial Review Panel: Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 (30 June 2009) at 129.
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rights to the marine and coastal area to an 1840 activity, and hinders the appropriate development 
of these rights for Mäori in 21st century New Zealand.
The New Zealand legislature then, appears to have stated clearly that only those Mäori cus-
tomary practices in the coastal and marine area that were able to survive colonisation, as opposed 
to those practices that were developed in response to it, are deemed sufficiently to be “Mäori” as a 
result of the above threshold tests.
viii. Waitangi triBunal EsPousEs thE indigEnous right to dEvEloPMEnt
The Waitangi Tribunal offered some hope when it discussed the notion of the “right to develop-
ment” in the 1988 Muriwhenua Fishing Report. The Waitangi Tribunal is a tribunal of inquiry 
with mostly non-binding recommendatory powers, but it is a forum for affirming traditional Mäori 
customary law, and a domestic source of law in terms of it being a determining body that reaf-
firms normative law within Mäori society.
Accordingly, the Tribunal noted in the Muriwhenua Fishing Report that traditional Mäori fish-
ing technology was advanced and access to new technology and markets were the quid pro quo for 
European settlement.79 The Tribunal then noted that there is nothing in either tradition, custom, the 
Treaty of Waitangi or nature to justify the view that Mäori fishing technology had to be frozen.80
Mäori no longer fish from canoes but nor do non-Mäori use wooden sailing boats. Nylon lines and nets, 
radar and echo sounders were unknown to either party at the time. Both had the right to acquire new gear, 
to adopt technologies developed in other countries and to learn from each other. … The Treaty offered a 
better life for both parties. A rule that limits Mäori to their old skills forecloses upon their future.81
Hence the Tribunal identified that freezing Mäori traditional fishing rights to 1840 would con-
comitantly limit non-Mäori to their catch capabilities at 1840.82 The Tribunal justified its stance 
by referring to the international right to development. The Tribunal asserted:83
That all people have a right to development is an emerging concept in international law following the 
Declaration on the Right to Development adopted on 4 December 1986 by 146 states (including New 
Zealand) in resolution 41/128 of the United Nations General Assembly. This includes the full develop-
ment of their resources. Professor Daniloi Turk, a leading drafter of the declaration considered:
 In other words, states should adopt special measures in favour of groups in order to create conditions 
favourable for their development. If a group claims that the realisation of its right to development 
requires a certain type of autonomy, such a claim should be considered legitimate.
79 Waitangi Tribunal Muriwhenua Fishing Report (Department of Justice, Wellington, 1988) [hereinafter Muriwhenua]; 
and Waitangi Tribunal Ngäi Tahu Sea Fisheries Report (Department of Justice, Wellington, 1992). In Muriwhenua, 
the Tribunal’s main findings of fact were that there was “a commercial component in pre-European tribal fisheries 
through ‘gift exchange’” and that gift exchange “was capable of adaptation” and indeed “adapted and developed to 
trade in Western terms”. (Muriwhenua, at 200).
80 Muriwhenua, above n 79, at 223. The right of Mäori to develop their rights through the international right to develop-
ment was also referred to in subsequent Waitangi Tribunal Reports including the Radio Spectrum Management and 
Development Report (Wai 776, Wellington, 1999); the Ahu Moana Aquaculture and Marine Farming Report (Wai 
953, Wellington, 2002); the Petroleum Report (Wai 796, Wellington, 2003); and the recent “Indigenous Flora and 
Fauna and Cultural Intellectual Property Claim” report entitled Ko Aotearoa Tenei: A Report into Claims Concerning 
New Zealand Law and Policy Affecting Mäori Culture and Identity (Wai 262, Wellington, 2011).
81 Muriwhenua, above n 79, at 223.
82 Ibid, above n 79.
83 Ibid, at 23–24.
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The International Symposium of Experts on Rights of Peoples and Solidarity Rights (UNESCO, San 
Marino, 1982) considered:
 The right to development is one of the most fundamental rights to which peoples are entitled, for its 
realisation is the source of respect for most of the fundamental rights and freedoms of peoples (UN-
ESCO SS-82/WS/61 Art 38).
It was added:
 Each people has the right to determine its own development by drawing on the fundamental values of 
its cultural traditions and on those aspirations which it considers to be its own. This right to authentic 
development is, in fact, three pronged: economic, social and cultural (Art. 40).
Hence, traditional Mäori fishing and all other traditional aboriginal and Treaty rights (including, 
inter alia, to land and the coastal and marine areas) should not be frozen in time to 1840.
iX. un dEclaration on thE rights of indigEnous PEoPlEs 2007
Public international law (customary and conventional) is increasingly becoming a source of wide-
ly held norms that form the backdrop against which domestic law can be assessed. The United Na-
tions Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is one such instrument that was adopted by 
the United Nations General Assembly during its 62nd session at UN Headquarters in New York 
City on 13 September 2007. While as a General Assembly Declaration it is not a legally binding 
instrument under international law, it does represent the dynamic development of international le-
gal norms and it reflects the commitment of the UN’s member states to move in certain directions. 
The UN describes it as setting:84
… an important standard for the treatment of indigenous peoples that will undoubtedly be a significant 
tool towards eliminating human rights violations against the planet’s 370 million indigenous people and 
assisting them in combating discrimination and marginalisation.
In terms of the present analyses on the right of indigenous peoples to develop their treaty and abo-
riginal rights, the Preamble of the Declaration states:
Concerned that indigenous peoples have suffered from historic injustices as a result of, inter alia, their 
colonization and dispossession of their lands, territories and resources, thus preventing them from exer-
cising, in particular, their right to development in accordance with their own needs and interests,
Convinced that control by indigenous peoples over developments affecting them and their lands, territo-
ries and resources will enable them to maintain and strengthen their institutions, cultures and traditions, 
and to promote their development in accordance with their aspirations and needs,
Recognizing and reaffirming that indigenous individuals are entitled without discrimination to all human 
rights recognized in international law, and that indigenous peoples possess collective rights which are 
indispensable for their existence, well-being and integral development as peoples.
It would appear that the Declaration supports the right of indigenous peoples to develop their 
rights in the preamble. The main ambit for advocating the right of indigenous peoples to contem-
poraneously develop their treaty and aboriginal rights in the articles is mostly under the umbrella 
of the inherent right of indigenous peoples to self-determination. In this respect, the relevant arti-
cles include Articles 3, 23, 31, 34 and 45 (refer to Appendix 1).
84 “Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Voices: Frequently Asked Questions on the Declaration on the Rights of Indige-
nous Peoples” (Unpublished document on the UN website about the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
2007) <www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/FAQsindigenousdeclaration.pdf>.
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The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples adds valuable context to our analysis 
by reiterating the self-determination right of indigenous peoples to develop their treaty and abo-
riginal rights and to not freeze them in some bygone era in a historic straight jacket. Article 45 is 
the second to last article which provides scope for indigenous peoples’ future rights to be claimed 
and developed which is thesis of this article – the indigenous right to develop past and present 
indigenous rights, and to develop future ones.
X. soME forMativE conclusions
Mäori self-determination and development are, inter alia, about Mäori having the capacity, right, 
space and responsibility to make fundamental choices that affect their identities, practices, cus-
toms and communities, and the rights that accrue to these communities, in a past, present and 
future context, not having these limited and frozen by legal verdict in a “historical diorama in a 
museum”.
However a contemporary legal and political challenge that hinders Mäori self-determination 
and development is the fossilisation and restriction of Mäori Treaty and aboriginal rights to a 
bygone era as determined by the judicial tests in the Van der Peet and Te Ika Whenua decisions. 
This fossilisation of Mäori rights decided not what Mäori had a right to do but what they actually 
did at a frozen point in time. Thus, the Van der Peet and Te Ika Whenua decisions conflict with 
the Mäori self-determination right to preserve and develop their laws, institutions and rights, and 
the processes eliciting the content and scope of those traditional laws, institutions and rights today 
and in the future.
The recently repealed Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 and the new Marine and Coastal Area 
(Takutai Moana) Act 2011 appear to continue to perpetuate the fossilising of Mäori marine and 
coastal rights into an 1840 “hunter-gatherer” exercise of those rights. The latter Act does provide 
some scope for Mäori customary rights to evolve, but this area is yet to be tested. Moreover, the 
historic truism that everything in Aotearoa New Zealand belonged to Mäori becomes a hard fact 
to prove when scrutinised by the imposed customary threshold tests of both statutes regarding the 
marine and coastal area. These tests appear to freeze already severely depleted Mäori Treaty and 
aboriginal rights within a historic strait-jacket thereby prohibiting the contemporary development 
of these rights.
The law appears then to be allowing colonial history to dictate what is and what is not able to 
be recognised as a contemporary Mäori right. Only the practices that were able to survive colo-
nisation, as opposed to those that were created in response to it, are deemed sufficiently “Mäori” 
that they thereby convert into contemporary Mäori rights. The result of such laws and policies is 
an epistemological and hermeneutic redefinition and misappropriation of Mäori culture and iden-
tity and the fossilising of those rights that accrue to that culture and identity.
The Waitangi Tribunal and international law, through the international right to development, 
and the preamble and at least four articles of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples support this right of Mäori to develop their cultures, identities and commensurate rights in a 
modern and future context.
Ultimately, what is required is an appropriate balancing and acknowledgment that Mäori Trea-
ty and aboriginal rights should not be locked and limited into a bygone era but must have the legal 
and political authority, space and capacity to develop in terms of scope and pace with mainstream 
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cultures. Mäori therefore seek to adapt these frozen rights according to 21st century Mäori self-
determination priorities, aspirations and needs, not those of the past.
aPPEndiX: un dEclaration on thE rights of indigEnous PEoPlEs 2007
Article 3
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
Article 23
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for exercising their 
right to development.
Article 31
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their cultural heritage, tra-
ditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions ... They also have the right to maintain, control, 
protect and develop their intellectual property over such cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and 
traditional cultural expressions.
Article 34
Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures and 
their distinctive customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases where they exist, 
juridical systems or customs, in accordance with international human rights standards.
Article 45
Nothing in this Declaration may be construed as diminishing or extinguishing the rights indigenous peo-
ples have now or may acquire in the future.
